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Aim of the audit
The Court examined the Commission’s management of the international fisheries agreements, particularly the
extent to which their objectiveshad been clearly defined and ultimately achieved. The Court’saudit focus ed
on the five mos t important agreementsin termsof the cos t borne by the Community budget (92 % in 1999).
The Court’smain obs ervationsare s et out below.
Cost-benefit ratio
I. The Commission still needs to set up a system enabling an ongoing monitoring and a detailed cost-benefit
analysis to be made of the international fisheries agreements. These measures should enable it to evaluate the
extent to which the objectives of these agreements (market supply, fishing opportunities, restructuring, jobs)
have been achieved.
— It is up to the Commission to define criteria and performance indicators for these agreements in order to
measure their effectiveness.
II. The fis hing opportunitiesavailable to Community fis hermen in the watersof third countriesunder inter-
national agreementsare not alwaysus ed to the full. The Community hasthuspaid financial compens ation for
fish which only existed on paper.
— The Commission is invited to ensure above all that actual use ismade of the fis hing opportunitiesoffered
by these agreements.
Intended purposes
III. The Court has found a lack of consistency and poor coordination between these international agreements
and the structural aspect of the common fisheries policy.
— The Commission could in particular ensure that the restructuring objectives of these agreements are con-
sistent with those of the Structural Funds, for example, in the financing of new boats.
IV. Several of the fisheries agreements are intended both to play a commercial role and to assist in develop-
ment aims . Thisintertwining of different purpos esmeansthat it isdifficult to evaluate the agreementsand
makes it even harder to distinguish between the responsibilities that lie with the Community and those which
belong to the third countries.
— If the Commission were to give a clear-cut definition of the various objectives of the fisheries agreements, it
would be able to measure their benefits and costs and compare them on the same basis.
Management and control
V. Management of the fis heriesagreementsisundermined by the faulty or uns uitable application of certain
clauses and by the fact that they do not stipulate any compulsory exchange of information.
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ing, for example, by inserting control clauses or by making payments dependent on progress; it should
review certain unwarranted practices of systematically unloading and reloading frozen fish.
VI. The Court’saudit identified s hortcomingsin the implementation and monitoring of the checksmade by
the Commission and the Member States.
— The Commission should plan its control activities and ensure that previous findings are followed up more
closely. Together with the Member States, it should also lay down guidelines on the detailed arrangements
for their inspections.
GENERAL CONTEXT
The fisheries agreements: what is at stake?
1. Fishery products are an important food resource for the Mem-
ber Statesof the EU. Their fis hing fleetshave traditionally pro-
vided a significant economic resource and source of employment.
A common fisheries policy has been set up for conserving fish
stocks, managing and adapting the development of the Member
States’ industrial structures, ensuring the common organisation of
the market and concluding fis heriesagreementswith non-
Community countries.
2. The principle of free access to the high seas gradually disap-
peared from the mid-1970sonwardsand in the wake of the third
United NationsConference on the Law of the Sea. Around that
time, more and more third countriesdecided to extend their
exclusive economic zone from 12 to 200 nautical miles and thus
about 90 % of fish resources came under the control of coastal
countries. As a consequence, the fleets of the European Union
Member States, which had previously fished these waters, no
longer had access to them (representing 9 % (1) of Community
consumption).
3. As a result of this state of affairs, plus the need for sound
management of fish stocks in short supply, the Community nego-
tiated fis heriesagreementswith third countries , thusenabling the
Member States ’ fleetsto continue their previousactivities . By
1 January 2001, the Commission had signed fisheries agreements
with 33 countries, 14 of which were still in force.
Nature of the fisheries agreements
4. Thes e agreementsdefine the level, the termsof allocation and
the use of the rights of access to fish resources in the exclusive
economic zonesof the third countries . They differ according to
the partner involved. A distinction is made between so-called
‘first-generation’ and ‘second-generation’ agreements.
The first-generation agreements are chiefly :
(a) reciprocal agreements, involving an exchange of fishing possi-
bilitiesbetween the fleetsof the Member Statesand thos e of
third countries; in general, the latter (for example Iceland,
Norway, the Faeroe Islands) fully exploit their resources. These
agreementsdo not require any financial contribution on the
part of the Community nor any fee (licence fee) to be paid by
the shipowners.
(b) agreements involving financial compensation, signed with third
countrieswhich want to concede part of the us e of their
resources, without any reciprocity of access rights, in return
for financial compensation borne by the Community budget
and (licence) fees paid by the shipowners holding these access
rights.
Thisfinancial compens ation takesthe form of contributions :
(i) to the State budget of the third country;
(ii) to measures in support of development cooperation;
(iii) to the public services of the fisheries sector (training pro-
grammes for fishermen and inspectors, scientific research
programmes concerning fish stocks, administration, etc.).
The cost of some of the development measures provided for
in these agreements, such as the presence of observers on
board or the recruitment of local crews, is borne directly by
the shipowners. The agreements with the African and Indian
Ocean countriescome under thiscategory; or
(c) agreements involving financial compensation and access to the Com-
munity market of fishery products coming from third countries
(without any cus tomsdutiesor quantitative res trictions ),
(
1) The Commission’s evaluation, carried out by Ifremer/CEP (Institut
françaisde recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer/Centre d’etudesde
projets), p. 63, September 1999.
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res ourcesin the watersof thos e countries(for example Green-
land), without the shipowners having to pay any fee.
The second-generation agreements aim at the setting-up by private
operators of joint ventures, which are responsible for the manage-
ment of European vessels and which are allocated fishing quotas
in the watersof third countries(the agreementsmay provide for
financial compensation for the fishing quotas). Furthermore, their
objective isfor ves s elsmaking up the fleetsof Member Statesto
be definitively or temporarily transferred to the fleets of third
countries(for example Argentina, Es tonia, Latvia, Lithuania).
5. From the outset, the purpose of the fisheries agreements has
been to safeguard the continued activity of the Member States’
fishing fleets, in return for financial contributions or fishing
opportunities, thus confirming that these agreements are com-
mercial in nature.
The main parties involved in the fisheries agreements
6. The main responsibilities of the parties involved in the fisher-
iesagreementsare asfollows :
Objective and scope of the audit
7. The objective of the audit wasto examine whether the Com-
mission had clearly defined the objectives of the international
fis heriesagreementsand whether it had s et up adequate perfor-
mance monitoring systems to measure their achievement.
8. The audit examined the management, during the period 1993
to 1999, of the agreementsmade with Morocco, Mauritania,
Greenland, Senegal and Argentina, which together accounted for
92 % of the paymentscharged to the financial year 1999. Thes e
are agreementsinvolving financing by the Community budget.
Taken as a whole, they are also the most important in terms of
fishing opportunities and in terms of first or second generation
agreements.
9. Through documentary analysis of the management systems,
the key activities were identified and then underwent audit tests.
Audit visits were conducted at the Commission, in the Member
States (Spain, France and Portugal) and in the Commission’s del-
egationsin Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. Audit evidence was
obtained by checks on documents and registers, the observation
of port activities, requests for and confirmation of information,
supplemented by interviews with representatives of third coun-
tries and selected organisations.
10. In itsAnnual Report concerning financial year 1999, the
Court stated that, for budget headings relating to international
fisheries agreements, the Commission had entered into legal obli-
gationswhich exceeded available appropriationsby 129 million
euro and that, asa cons equence, the commitmentsfor the finan-
cial year had been understated (1). Thisques tion hastherefore not
been dealt with in thisReport.
Budgetary aspects
11. Annex I shows the budgetary expenditure for the interna-
tional fis heriesagreementsfor the period 1993 to 2000, and its
relationship with the total expenditure borne by the common
fis heriespolicy. Between 1993 and 1997 there wasan upward
trend in the amountspaid to the partner countriesin return for
fishing rights, but since 1998 the level of these amounts has sta-
bilised (see the Graph).
(
1) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999 (OJ C 342,
1.12.2000, p. 189).
Main responsibilities
Council Budgetary authority; gives the Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement,
including the level of fishing opportunities; adopts the agreement by means of a regula-
tion and signs it
Parliament Budgetary authority; consulted for an opinion
Commission: Brussels Negotiates the agreements; takes care of the administrative, financial and technical man-
agement
Commission: Delegations On a case-by-case basis, deconcentrated management by a fisheries unit in accordance
with the provisions of the agreement
Member States Responsible for applying the control measures and other provisions of the fisheries
agreements
Third countries Negotiate the agreements; control and supervision in their ports and exclusive economic
zones
ShipownersFor the ’agreements involving financial compens ation’ mentioned in paragraph 4(b),
payment of licence feesto the third country in return for acces srights ; compliance with
any specific conditions (for example crews to consist of nationals of the third country)
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ated agreements. Other contributory factors are the new catego-
ries of fishing inserted into some of the agreements, as in the case
of Mauritania and Senegal, higher ratesof financial compens ation
and the increasing scarcity of fish stocks. The increase in com-
mitmentsand paymentsthat occurred from 1995 to 1996 isdue
to the implementation of new agreements, in particular the
Morocco Agreement. See Annex II: Morocco, providing 74 % of
the catchesunder the ‘Southern’ Agreements( 1) for the period
1993 to 1997, wasthe mos t important partner, whereasSpain,
with more than 87 % of the catches, was the prime beneficiary of
these agreements (2).
THE COST-BENEFIT RATIO OF THE FISHERIES AGREEMENTS
An instrument for monitoring the agreements
13. In itsAnnual Report for financial year 1992 ( 3), the Court
stressed the importance of cost-benefit analyses, as part of the
monitoring of these agreements by the Commission. These analy-
s esrequire the definition of criteria and indicatorsmaking it pos -
sible to evaluate the extent to which the agreements’ objectives
have been achieved. In the Fis heriesCouncil’sconclus ionsof
30 October 1997, the Commission was requested to draw up
cost-benefit analyses for each agreement (or renegotiation of an
agreement) well before they were signed. The Commission’s
response to this request by the Council has been twofold: it has
arranged for an external evaluation to be made and it hasdrawn
up individual technical data sheets.
14. The evaluation of the international fis heriesagreementsfor
the period 1993 to 1997, for which the Commission used the ser-
vicesof an external cons ultant ( 4), consists of an examination of
variousas pectsof the agreements , but doesnot cons titute a full
cost-benefit analysis. This evaluation contains reservations con-
cerning the quality, completeness, relevance and reliability of the
information available. These reservations undermine the conclu-
sions of the evaluation and indicate that the Commission needs
to improve itscollection of data from the Member States .
(
1) International Fis heriesAgreementss igned with certain countriess itu-
ated to the south of the Strait of Gibraltar.
(
2) Spain is also the second largest market in Europe in terms of both the
supply available and the per capita consumption.
(
3) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1992, Chapter 5
(OJ C 309, 16.11.1993). (
4) Ifremer/CEP.
Graph
International fis heriesagreements— Commitmentsand payments(implementation), value of catches
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Commitments
Payments
Value of catches
Year
M
i
o
 
E
U
R
NB: Figuresfor catchesnot available at the Commis s ion for 1998 and 1999.
C 210/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities27.7.200115. Although this evaluation pinpointed weaknesses and set out
useful conclusions and recommendations on the management
and monitoring of the agreements, the Commission is still study-
ing whether and how to implement these findings. However, this
evaluation, together with its recommendations, ought to be used
as a basis for developing an ongoing monitoring system which
also incorporates a cost-benefit analysis.
16. For the Community, the added value of some agreements is
higher than others and, in some cases, it is even negative. In terms
of the value of the catch, one euro spent on financial compensa-
tion represented 0,9 euro for the Greenland Agreement and
3,4 euro for the Mauritania Agreement (see Annex III). Without
calling into question the very existence of the fisheries agree-
ments, an ongoing monitoring system and an analysis of their
cost-benefit ratio could enable this situation to be clarified.
17. Between 1993 and 1999 there wasa 42 % increas e in the
appropriations for payments under these agreements. The same
period saw a slight decline in the fishing opportunities offered by
the agreements. As pointed out above, the increase in the cost to
the budget can in part be attributed to variousfactors(s uch asthe
increase in the rates of financial compensation under some agree-
ments, or the depletion of fish stocks). However, in order to quan-
tify the effectsor impact of thes e factorson the actual increas e in
the cost of an agreement, a detailed analysis is needed.
18. Asregardsthe technical data s heetsdrawn up by the Com-
mission for each individual agreement, four of the eight sheets
examined by the Court did not contain data on catch quantities
and none of them contained information on the value of these
catches. Although these data sheets contain certain aspects of a
cost-benefit analysis and have improved since they were first
introduced, some of the key data are still too vague to allow a
meaningful analysis. They also fail to satisfy the requests made by
the Council, referred to in paragraph 13.
Underutilisation of the agreements
19. When an agreement is being negotiated, the Commission
us esthe catchesdeclared by the s hipownersin the previouspro-
tocols , the ratesof us e in termsof the number of licencestaken
out and the es timatesmade by the Member Statesof their fis hing
needs. The Commission’s evaluation of these estimates ought to
be the bas isfor the agreementsto be negotiated, given the impact
they may have on the cost to be negotiated, on the balance of fish
stocks and on the level of take-up of fishing opportunities.
20. In practice, the Member States’ fishing fleets tend to overes-
timate their needs, which may lead to extra cost for the agree-
ment, but also to underutilisation of the catch opportunities pro-
vided for by the agreement. This underutilisation may to some
extent be explained by the shipowners’ wish to safeguard for
themselves the possibility of fishing in these waters, even if the
latter are not economically viable. Their interest is speculative in
so far as, even where the fishing opportunities available to Com-
munity fishermen are not fully used, the Community pays finan-
cial compensation for the total catches initially provided for.
21. By way of example, two of the agreements(Senegal, Green-
land) were underused, despite price increases at recent renewals.
The Senegal Agreement continuesto be underus ed: in addition to
the longer period of the new Agreement (1997 to 2001), the total
Community contribution hasincreas ed by 33 % per year. Thishas
been criticised by the Commission’s own Financial Controller (1).
Furthermore, thisAgreement ( 2) coversthe new category of fis h-
ing, ‘pelagic freezer trawlers’, which has not been used at all, but
the cost of which has been borne by the Commission. The prob-
lem is that the Commission pays an overall amount for each
agreement, without the costs being divided up between the vari-
ous fishing categories. As a result, even if one of the fishing cat-
egories(belonging under the s ame agreement) isunderus ed or
not us ed at all, thisdoesnot lead to a reduction in the overall cos t
borne by the Commission.
22. The Greenland Agreement, for itspart, hasbeen underus ed
in the main fishing categories (cod and redfish). The Commis-
sion’s technical data sheets (3) pointed out that, owing to the low
utilisation rate, the costs involved had not brought any benefit in
terms of catches for most of the fishing possibilities provided for
by the 1995 to 2000 Agreement. The scientific data available
show that the underuse of this Agreement is largely due to a
severe depletion of fish stocks. The EU has therefore paid for
catches which potentially did not exist, i.e. for ‘paper’ fish (see the
Table). In the meantime, the agreement with Greenland was
renewed in 2000, without the Commission taking sufficient
account of itshigh cos t, the October 1999 evaluation or even its
technical data sheets.
23. The Commission should ensure that the Member States’ fish-
ing fleetsundertake actually to make us e of the catch opportuni-
ties, so as to avoid unnecessary costs. One solution could be to
require them to lodge guaranteesor to pay a higher advance ( 4)i n
order to deter purely speculative applications. There needs to be
close cooperation between the Commission and the Member
Statesin thisres pect.
(
1) Letter from the Financial control DG sent to the Fisheries DG on 5
October 1997.
(
2) Agreement lasting from 1 May 1997 to 30 April 2001.
(
3) Commission working paper of 2 February 2000, p. 9.
(
4) Usually, the owners of tuna fishing vessels have to pay fees calculated
on the basis of 20 euro per tonne, with a minimum catch which var-
iesfrom one agreement to another. In thiscontext, thisamount is
called an ‘advance’. The shipowner has to pay it in order to obtain a
fishing licence. At the end of the fishing period, there is a settlement
procedure and, if the catch is higher than foreseen, the shipowner
paysthe difference. The advance, by contras t, isnot refunded.
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24. The costs to be shared consist of financial compensation
paid by the Community and a fee paid by the private shipowners
wanting to fish in the waters of third countries (see also above).
25. The share of the financing which the Community has had to
bear out of public fundscan be put at 85,7 % of the total cos t of
the agreementsinvolving financial compens ation ( 1). In the light
of the intentions it has expressed in the past (2), the Commission
should investigate the advisability, methods and consequences of
sharing out the costs in a more balanced manner.
Indispensable information
26. Lastly, in spite of the weaknesses pointed out in the preced-
ing paragraphs, the Commission was not able to draw up a com-
plete balance sheet of the costs and benefits of the international
fisheries agreements since the last evaluation, made in 1999: it
was able to supply data on costs but not for the value of the
catchesnorfortheirdirectorindirectimpact(onjobs,forexample).
In commercial negotiations , however, asisthe cas e with the inter-
national fisheries agreements, it is absolutely vital for these figures
to be available.
27. Furthermore, in itsRes olution of 15 May 1997 ( 3), the Euro-
pean Parliament called on the Commission to draw up a set of
guidelinesto enable a uniform procedure when evaluating the
implementation of expiring protocolson fis hing opportunitiesor
preparing for negotiationson new protocolsor agreements .
THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENTS
Stability of fishing opportunities
28. One of the general objectivesof thes e agreementsisto offer
stable fishing opportunities to the fleets of Member States. Dur-
ing the period 1993 to 1999, there was a slight decline in the fish-
ing opportunities, because of their reduction under the Morocco
Agreement, as well as their stability or slight increase in other
agreements( 4).
29. Nevertheless, during the same period the payment appro-
priationsdevoted to the agreementsincreas ed, which confirms
the Commission’s wish to ensure that these fishing opportunities
have a more stable basis. In the 12 months following the expiry
of the EU-Morocco Agreement on 30 November 1999, there was
a substantial overall decrease in the fishing opportunities pro-
vided for by the agreements, notably at the expense of the
Spanish and Portuguese fishermen.
Supply to the market and aid to employment
30. The fisheries agreements aim to ensure supplies to a market
which on the whole has a shortage, and to safeguard jobs. The
Commission does not have up-to-date figures on the impact of
each agreement on these two aspects, which, moreover, are not
systematically analysed in the technical data sheets referred to
above. The only source of information in this respect is the evalu-
ation of the agreementsthat wasmade on the Commis s ion’s
behalf for the period 1993 to 1997.
31. In order systematically to measure the impact of the agree-
ments on the supply to the market and on employment, suitable
criteria and indicatorsneed to be defined (for example: data on
landingsand catchesin termsof their quantity and value; direct
or indirect jobs). Furthermore, this would make it possible to
evaluate the potential risk and the consequences to which the
Commissionislayingitselfopenwhenagreementsarenotrenewed,
(
1) The Community’s share in the financing of the total cost of the fisher-
ies agreements, for 1992 and 1997 respectively, was 82 % and 84 %
for Morocco, 73 % and 82 % for Mauritania, 89 % and 90 % for Sene-
gal and 100 % (constant figure) for Greenland.
(
2) COM(96) 488 of 30 October 1998.
(
3) Minutes of the European Parliament, Resolution on international fish-
eriesagreements , 15 May 1997, A4-0149/1997. (
4) The Commission’s ‘Ifremer’ evaluation, Chapter 4.1, p. 131.
Table
Utilisation of fishing opportunities — Greenland Agreement
Quota available/fishing opportunity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Greenland (t) (all species) 267 144 267 294 253 294 250 034 239 309
— Utilisation 80 330 148 588 142 388 128 786 90 004
— Percentage 30,0 55,6 56,1 51,5 37,6
Financial compensation (mio EUR) 37,7 37,7 37,7 37,7 37,7
Source: Internal Commission document of 2 February2000.
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thiscontext, the non-renewal of the agreement with Morocco in
1999 had considerable economic and social repercussions (about
7 000 direct jobs and 470 vessels) in the regions of Europe which
were heavily dependent on it (in particular, Spain and Portugal).
Restructuring strategy
32. The structural aspect of the common fisheries policy aims in
particular to achieve:
(a) a balance between the capacitiesof the fis hing fleetsand fis h
stocks;
(b) promotion of the development of the regionsthat are depen-
dent on fishing;
(c) elimination of surplus capacities;
(d) the construction and modernisation of fleets, under certain
conditions.
Thisaspectof‘structuralmeasures’islinked,amongstotherthings,
to that of the international fisheries agreements, and thus clear,
consistent objectives need to be set and the measures taken need
to be closely coordinated.
33. DuringthenegotiationsfortheInternationalFisheriesAgree-
ment with Morocco in 1994 and 1995, it wasfound that fis h
s tocksin Moroccan waterswere tending to become depleted and
that the fishing sector in Morocco was being developed. This
ought to have prompted a policy of gradually restructuring the
fleetsof the Member Statesoperating in thes e waters , asthe Com-
missionstatedduringthenegotiations.Apolicyofthiskindwould
have allowed the gradual implementation of restructuring mea-
sures (such as the redeployment of vessels) and of social measures
to limit the effects on the Community fishing sector; it would also
have made the Community fleetsles sdependent on thisAgree-
ment. The sector’s stability and sustainable development could
thushave been s afeguarded. Asit was , out of a total of 125 new
boats (in particular Spanish and Portuguese) having fished in
Moroccan waters(the 1995 to 1999 Agreement), 54 were found
to have been constructed using European Community
co-financing. The Commission, in partnership with the Member
States, had not set any clear objectives for the granting of the
(Structural Fund) aid for the construction of new vessels nor had
it monitored the subsequent use of this aid. There are two ques-
tionswhich s pring to mind here: wasthisins trument an integral
part of an overall plan for restructuring the Member States’ fish-
ing fleets? Was the decline in the number of fishing licences, as
reflected in the decrease in the number of vessels from 590 to 477
between 1996 and 1999, the sole outcome of the implementa-
tion of the restructuring objective? Thus, for some agreements,
the Commission was not able to show any relationship between
the negotiating aim and the common fisheries policy objective to
reduce the fishing effort in Community waters (1). There isthus
still a lack of consistency between these two aspects of the com-
mon fisheries policy.
34. Furthermore, the construction of the vessels was undertaken
without any systematic check as to whether the catch capacities
were appropriate for the resources covered by the agreements.
Since the expiry of the Moroccan Agreement and the consequent
discontinuation of fishing in Moroccan waters, the fleets con-
cerned have, on certain conditions, received indemnities that are
co-financed by the Community and are intended to offset the cor-
responding losses in income. For 2000, the amount budgeted for
thes e indemnitieswas124 million euro, 59 million euro of which
wasfinanced by the Community budget.
35. Other initiativesof a s tructural nature have not alwayshad
theexpectedimpact.Thisapppliestothesecond-generationagree-
ments(s ee definition in paragraph 4) which aim, through the
setting-up of joint ventures, to preserve the fishing opportunities
available to the Community fleet, to maintain a certain level of
Community employment (2) and to transfer fishing vessels to the
watersof third countries . The only agreement of importance was
signed with Argentina (162 million euro); this allowed the transfer
of 32 vessels and the safeguarding of about 1 000 Community
jobs, until Argentina decided to increase the minimum number of
Argentinian seamen to be included in the crews of these vessels
(inthelongterm,thismeasurecouldaffect600Communityjobs).
The limited impact of thistype of agreement can be attributed to
a lack of interest on the part of the third countries and the deple-
tion of fish stocks.
36. All in all, before Structural Fund aid isgranted to the Com-
munity fleet fishing under international agreements, the Commis-
sion and the Member States should set clear objectives. The vari-
ousas pectsof the common fis heriespolicy could be made more
consistent, in particular with the Structural Funds. Given the risks
faced by the Community, in particular in the event of the non-
renewal of the agreements, it is especially important under these
agreementsfor there to be s trategic planning and for the imple-
mentation of the measures to develop a stable fishing sector to be
monitored effectively.
Coordination of Community policies
37. Some of the countriesthat are s ignatoriesof an international
fisheries agreement also benefit from other Community policies,
such as development aid financed by the Community budget or
by the European Development Fund (EDF). It istherefore neces -
sary to ensure that there is consistency between and coordination
of the measures taken in the fisheries and development fields (2).
Thismeansthat due regard needsto be paid to the s pecific nature
of each area (the commercial nature and development aid), since
each isvalid in itsown way.
(
1) The Commission’s ‘Ifremer’ evaluation, p. 153. (
2) Council Conclusions 11784/97 of 4 November 1997.
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national fisheries agreements may form a substantial portion of
the national revenue: for example in 1998, thisproportion was
15,2 % in Mauritania and 12,7 % in São Tomé.
39. When the agreement with Senegal expired in 1997, the
Commission was unable to accept the price requested. Agreement
was reached after the Commission drew attention to an increase
of an undefined amount in the EDF funding (1). In thisins tance,
neither transparency nor the budgetary principle of specification
of expenditure wasabided by. The budgetary authoritiess hould
always be able to establish the full actual cost of fishing rights. All
too often, the intended purposes of the two Community policies
are intertwined in these agreements. Their objectives therefore
need to be clearly defined in the agreements. Furthermore, the
Commission should ensure that its own departments act in coor-
dination with one another when implementing all the policies
likely to affect the EU’srelationswith developing countries , pur-
suant to Article 178 of the Treaty and the Lomé Convention.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS
Management shortcomings
40. Each international fis heriesagreement ismanaged by a ‘Joint
Committee’, consisting of the Commission, the partner third
countries and, for certain agreements, representatives from the
Council and the Member Statesconcerned.
41. These Joint Committees operate throughout the duration of
the agreements. For the most part, they have to deal with two
typesof difficulty, which they have not alwaysmanaged to s ettle
satisfactorily:thefinancingofdevelopmentprojectsandtheimple-
mentation of projects for the satellite surveillance of vessels.
42. The Commission’s negotiating hand has been weakened
where the agreementsdo not contain a claus e providing for the
compulsory exchange of scientific information, the stopping of
paymentsin the event of dis putesor the adjus tment of financial
componentswhen meas uresare taken that may affect the fis hing
opportunities. In 1998 and in 1999, for example, Morocco sus-
pended cephalopod fis hing for two monthson groundsrelating
to the biology of the species, in addition to the two months’ stop
already agreed by the parties involved. The Commission will
remain committed to paying Morocco the full financial compen-
sation, even for the period covered by this unilateral suspension,
not provided for by the agreement.
43. The agreementsinclude claus ess tipulating that part of the
financial compensation may be devoted to financing specific mea-
sures and to training, with the aim of contributing to the sustain-
able development of the fishing sector in the third country. If this
is the case, it would be logical for those managing the agreements
to be informed of how these clauses have been applied. However,
since the third countries consider that these agreements are above
all commercial in nature, giving acces sto territorial watersin
return for financial compensation, they regard the financing of
such measures as more or less optional. As a consequence, some
of these countries (2) do not allow outside checks and so the
Commission does not have any information on the use of these
funds.
44. If such clauses are to be included in these agreements, the
Commissionshouldmakethemmorelegallybindingandimprove
their monitoring, for example by inserting clauses concerning
checksor paymentswhich are dependent on the progres smade.
In any case, a clearer distinction needs to be made between the
commercial aspects and the development aid aspects.
45. Someagreementsprovideforvoluntaryorcompulsoryland-
ing of catchesin the partner country, in order to contribute to
employment in the fishing sector. In this case, the vessels benefit
from reduced fees for their fishing licences.
46. For the Morocco Agreement, the Court found, on the basis
ofrandomsampling,thatthepracticeofEuropeanvesselsunload-
ing and reloading their entire catch had occurred in four of the
five cases examined in the period from 4 December 1998 to
2 March 1999. Even if the aim isto obtain a reduction in the
licence fee, thispractice cannot be jus tified: there isno point
whatsoever in frozen fish being systematically unloaded and then
reloaded at a Moroccan port when it is intended to be sold else-
where. It meansthat a fundamental as pect of the Morocco Agree-
ment isnot being obs erved, namely greater cooperation in order
to develop the Moroccan fishing sector.
47. The Commission should ensure that the agreements are
applied literally but also that the shipowners interpret them in a
common-sense manner. If need be, it should issue them with
explanatory guidelines.
Control shortcomings
48. The Commission has set up an Inspection and Control Unit
within the Fisheries DG to supervise the application of Commu-
nity regulations, and the monitoring thereof, concerning the
activities of the Member States’ fishing fleets in the waters of third
countries. The Unit’s inspectors regularly attend national inspec-
tionsin the Member Statesasobs ervers .
(
1) Commissionletter000405of4 March 1997totheSenegaleseauthori-
ties.
(
2) The countries concerned are those coming under the scope of the
audit referred to in paragraph 8.
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control objectivesand s pecific checksfor the international fis her-
ies agreements. These objectives and checks should also be
reviewed, approved and monitored by those in charge of the Unit.
Moreover, there hasnot alwaysbeen adequate follow-up of the
infringementsdetected during the Unit’sins pectionsin the Mem-
ber States.
50. Furthermore,Article1ofCouncilRegulation(EEC)No 2847/
93 (1) requiresMember Statesto introduce the neces s ary mea-
sures to ensure the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy
and also covers the activities of EU fishing vessels operating in the
watersof third countries . Articles2 to 5 require Member States
to carry out inspections and monitoring of fishing vessels.
51. The weaknes s esidentified by the Court’saudit were asfol-
lows:
(a) the catch and landing declarationsdue to be s ubmitted were
not systematically required by the national authorities and
were often incomplete or missing from the files;
(b) inspection practices were not uniform and there were short-
comings in the landings, found during the on-board inspec-
tions;
(c) requestsforadministrativecooperationbetweentheflagMem-
ber State and the country where the landing took place, pur-
suant to Article 33 of the Regulation, were not always acted
upon.
52. Although primary responsibility for inspection of the fish-
ing activitiesin the watersof a third country lieswith the country
concerned, European vessels must comply with the international
fis heriesagreementsand with the provis ionsof the regulationsin
force. Their landingsof catchesare thuss ubject to checkswhen
they are made in the port of a Member State.
53. The Court’saudit, at the time of the ins pectionsin which it
took part, revealed infringementsfound to have been committed
by fishing vessels. These concerned the landing of juvenile fish,
incomplete or incorrect logbook information (mostly underdecla-
ration of catches), incomplete logbook pages and infringements
of the crewing requirements. The shortcomings that have been
identified, especially those concerning the logbook, do not enable
the Commission to ensure proper monitoring of the implementa-
tion of the agreementsnor to evaluate their benefit.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Cost-benefit ratio
54. Even though the Commission made an evaluation in 1999
of the international fis heriesagreementsand hasintroduced tech-
nical data sheets for use when an agreement is being negotiated
or renegotiated, thishasenabled neither ongoing monitoring nor
a detailed cost-benefit analysis of each agreement to be made. As
a result, the Commission can neither identify nor remedy the
weaknesses detected by the Court (lack of good-quality informa-
tion on the fish stocks situation, on the financial compensation
which iscalculated without taking into account the rate of utilis a-
tion of the agreements, on the return obtained or expected from
these agreements, etc.), which give rise to extra costs (see para-
graphs13 to 18).
— The Court recommends that the Commission put in place an
ongoing monitoring system (and therefore allocates itself the
means to do so) which would make it possible to analyse the
benefitsof each agreement throughout itscycle: ( ex ante)
negotiation or renegotiation, implementation, ex post evalu-
ation. To this end, the Commission should on the one hand
determine criteria making it possible to assess the extent to
which clearly defined objectiveshave been achieved and, on
the other, establish suitable performance indicators. The sys-
tem to be set up must make it possible to analyse the fishing
opportunitiesavailable(thesupply)andtheuseactuallymade
of them (the demand), whilst taking into account the capaci-
ties of the fishing fleets and their specialisation.
55. The Commission currently finances about 80 % of the cost
of the fisheries agreements involving financial compensation. At
the same time, the fishing opportunities offered by some agree-
ments are not used to the full, leading to extra cost for the Com-
munity budget. For want of a detailed analysis of the economic
and financial value of these agreements, it is impossible to pass
judgement on their usefulness (see paragraphs 19 to 27).
— The Commission should analyse whether it would be expedi-
ent to share out the costs in a more balanced manner, how
best to achieve this and what the consequences would be. The
aim of such a study would also be to analyse the relationship
between the cost of a fishing licence and the amount of turn-
over resulting from it. The Commission should also take
measures to ensure actual take-up of the fishing opportuni-
ties offered by these agreements. Possible solutions that could
be considered include the lodging of guarantees, payment of
higher advances by the shipowners, or payment, by either the
Commission or the shipowners, only for actual catches.
The intended purpose of the agreements
56. Some fis heriesagreementsinclude a commercial as pect, i.e.
an access fee, whilst at the same time being intended to contribute
to the development of the fishing sector in the third country. In
some cases, the development aid funds are additional to the finan-
cial compensation, a practice which is contrary to the principle
of budgetary specification. The intended purposes of two Com-
munity policiesare thusclos ely intertwined, making it difficult to
(
1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993
(OJ L 261, 20.10.1993).
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activitiesin an agreement of a commercial nature makesit even
harder to distinguish between the responsibilities of the Commis-
sion and those of the third countries (see paragraphs 37 to 39).
— If a clearer distinction were to be made between these two
intendedpurposes,itwouldbepossibletomeasuretheircosts
and benefits, to compare these agreements on the same basis
and to identify those which were most burdensome. It is
essential that their various aims be defined and translated
into practice. The Commission departments should take
action to ens ure that the variousCommunity policiesare
consistent with one another.
57. Theinternationalfisheriesagreementshavetoacertainextent
helped to make the fishing opportunities available to the Member
States’ fleets more stable. However, their impact on the supply to
the market and on employment is not systematically analysed and
theCommissiondoesnothaveanyup-to-datefigures.Therecould
be greater consistency between the common fisheries policy’s
structural aspect and the international fisheries agreements (see
paragraphs28 to 36).
— The Commission should strengthen its global strategy for
developing the fishing sector and ensure that the stabilising
and restructuring measures taken are monitored. This strat-
egy should be based on a detailed economic and financial
analysis of the agreements, and on a study of the conse-
quencesfor the Community of the non-renewal of any of
theseagreements,especiallyforthoseregionsofEuropewhich
depend on them. This strategy should also be based on an
analys isof changing trendswhos e impact could prove to be
important (for example, the depletion of fish stocks). This
would make it possible to anticipate the intervention mea-
sures that needed to be taken by the public authorities. When
the Commission finds that a third country has been able to
develop its own fishing sector, the Community, in partner-
ship with this third country, should promote a sustainable
fishing policy, start restructuring the Community fishing
fleetsconcernedandmakeprovisionforthenecessaryaccom-
panying measures.
Management shortcomings
58. The present management of the fisheries agreements by the
Commission departments is purely administrative. It lacks con-
sistency, mainly because of the intertwining of the aims of most
of the agreementsand becaus e their legal framework isnot very
strict (see paragraphs 42 to 46).
— Theirvariousobjectivesshouldbespelledoutandatthesame
time there should be a clear demarcation of the responsibili-
ties of the Commission’s management departments. The lat-
ter’s management of fish stocks should be more careful and
more forward-looking. The Commission should ensure the
reciprocalapplicationoftheagreementsand,ifneedbe,make
them stricter (clause stipulating checks or payment depen-
dent on the progress made).
Control shortcomings
59. The Court has identified a number of weaknesses in the
inspection activities carried out by the Commission and by the
Member States(s ee paragraphs47 to 52).
— The Commission and the Member States should be encour-
aged to work together on drawing up guidelineson the
detailed arrangementsfor the checksto be carried out by the
Member States. The inspection and monitoring activities car-
ried out by the Commission departments could be more
effective if objectiveswere s et, the activitiesbetter planned
and if previousfindingswere follow up more clos ely.
Thisreport wasadopted by the Court of Auditorsin Luxembourg at itsmeeting of 6 and 7 June 2001.
For the Court of Auditors
Jan O. KARLSSON
President
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BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE 1993 to 2000
(1993 to 1999: OUTTURN; 2000: APPROPRIATIONS)
Budget heading B7-8000: ‘International fisheries agreements’
(Mio EUR)
Budget year Type of
appropriation Final budget Execution Total expenditure
CFP
IFA/CFP
%
(a) (b) (d) (e)=(b)/(d)
1993 C 210,0 181,3 657,1 27,6
P 213,5 188,9 575,7 32,8
1994 C 266,0 258,3 716,4 36,1
P 221,0 140,6 604,3 23,3
1995 C 126,0
35,0 (
*)
111,8 677,5 16,5
P2 2 1 , 0
35,0 (
*)
158,0 481,3 32,8
1996 C 295,8 289,7 854,5 33,9
P 270,0 250,9 752,6 33,3
1997 C 223,3 221,7 727,3 30,5
P 293,9 283,3 864,3 32,8
1998 C 272,3 269,4 910,1 29,6
P 277,3 271,4 824,2 32,9
1999 C 249,5
30,5 (
*)
263,2 1 143,4 23,0
P 262,8
26,2 (
*)
269,0 991,1 27,1
2000 C 117,3
155,0 (
*)
121,6 694,0 17,52
P1 2 1 , 8
148,0 (
*)
124,8 747,1 16,70
(
*) Amountsallocated in Chapter B0-4 0.
IFA: International fisheries agreements.
CFP: Common fisheries policy.
C = commitments, P = payments.
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INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES AGREEMENTS — LEGAL BASIS PER AGREEMENT
Agreement Duration
Financial
compensation
(in euro)
Other expenses
(in euro)
Total
Agreement
Percentage
other
expenses in
total Scientific
programmes GrantsOther Des cription
Subtotal
other
expenses
EU-Angola
Council Regulation (EEC) No 594/93 of 8.3.1993 3.5.1992 to 2.5.1994 13 900 000 2 800 000 1 800 000 4 600 000 18 500 000 25 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 3020/94 of 6.12.1994 3.5.1994 to 2.5.1996 13 900 000 2 800 000 1 800 000 4 600 000 18 500 000 25 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 910/97 of 14.5.1997 3.5.1996 to 2.5.1999 31 000 000 5 000 000 3 000 000 1 050 000 Research 9 050 000 40 050 000 23 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 103/2000 of 29.11.1999 3.5.1999 to 2.5.2000 10 300 000 1 700 000 1 000 000 350 000 3 050 000 13 350 000 23 %
Subtotal 69 100 000 12 300 000 7 600 000 1 400 000 21 300 000 90 400 000 24 %
EU-Argentina Unidentified
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3447/93 of 28.9.1993 5 years(valid on
24.5.1994)
162 500 000 28 000 000 28 000 000 190 500 000 15 %
Subtotal 162 500 000 28 000 000 0 0 28 000 000 190 500 000 15 %
EU-Cape Verde
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2321/90 of 24.7.1990 6.9.1991 to 5.9.1994 1 950 000 500 000 160 000 660 000 2 610 000 25 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 2028/95 of 29.6.1995 6.9.1994 to 5.9.1997 1 063 500 261 900 174 600 436 500 1 500 000 29 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 200/98 of 20.1.1998 6.9.1997 to 5.9.2000 1 086 000 267 440 178 300 445 740 1 531 740 29 %
Subtotal 4 099 500 1 029 340 512 900 0 1 542 240 5 641 740 27 %
EU-Comoros
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2885/92 of 28.9.1992 20.7.1991 to 19.7.1994 900 000 325 000 175 000 500 000 1 400 000 36 %
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1893/95 of 29.6.1995 20.7.1994 to 19.7.1997 675 000 260 000 145 000 405 000 1 080 000 38 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 2127/98 of 1.10.1998 28.2.1998 to 27.2.2001 540 000 250 000 60 000 230 000 540 000 1 080 000 50 %
Subtotal 2 115 000 835 000 380 000 230 000 1 445 000 3 560 000 41 %
EU-Ivory Coast
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3939/90 of 19.12.1990 22.12.1990 to
10.1.1994
6 000 000 600 000 500 000 1 100 000 7 100 000 15 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1894/95 of 29.6.1995 1.7.1994 to 30.6.1997 2 100 000 250 000 150 000 400 000 2 500 000 16 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 238/98 of 20.1.1998 1.7.1997 to 30.6.2000 2 400 000 100 000 100 000 400 000 600 000 3 000 000 20 %
Subtotal 10 500 000 950 000 750 000 400 000 2 100 000 12 600 000 17 %
EU-Gabon
Council Regulation (EC) No 2469/98 of 9.11.1998 3.12.1998 to 2.12.2001 810 000 200 000 105 000 910 000 1 215 000 2 025 000 60 %
Subtotal 810 000 200 000 105 000 910 000 1 215 000 2 025 000 60 %
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compensation
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Agreement
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other
expenses in
total Scientific
programmes GrantsOther Des cription
Subtotal
other
expenses
EU-Gambia
Council Regulation (EC) No 634/94 of 10.5.1994 1.7.1993 to 30.6.1996 1 100 000 80 000 220 000 300 000 1 400 000 21 %
Subtotal 1 100 000 80 000 220 000 0 300 000 1 400 000 21 %
EU-Greenland
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2647/90 of 16.7.1990 1.1.1990 to 31.12.1994 171 250 000 6 000 000 Joint ventures6 000 000 177 250 000 3 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 3354/94 of 19.12.1994 1.1.1995 to 31.12.2000 226 200 000 0 226 200 000 0 %
Subtotal 397 450 000 0 0 6 000 000 6 000 000 403 450 000 1 %
EU-Guinea (Conakry)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3680/92 of 7.12.1992 1.1.1992 to 31.12.1993 6 700 000 400 000 400 000 800 000 7 500 000 11 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 2663/95 of 24.7.1995 1.1.1994 to 31.12.1995 1 700 000 450 000 550 000 1 000 000 2 700 000 37 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 909/97 of 14.5.1997 1.1.1996 to 31.12.1997 2 450 000 400 000 250 000 900 000 1 550 000 4 000 000 39 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1660/98 of 20.7.1998 1.1.1998 to 31.12.1999 3 250 000 450 000 390 000 2 410 000 3 250 000 6 500 000 50 %
Subtotal 14 100 000 1 700 000 1 590 000 3 310 000 6 600 000 20 700 000 32 %
EU-Guinea-Bissau
Council Regulation (EEC) No 410/94 of 14.2.1994 16.6.1993 to 15.6.1995 12 000 000 450 000 250 000 700 000 12 700 000 6 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 576/96 of 21.3.1996 16.6.1995 to 15.6.1997 12 000 000 150 000 100 000 450 000 700 000 12 700 000 6 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 2615/97 of 18.12.1997 16.6.1997 to 15.6.2001 27 363 000 300 000 400 000 1 300 000 Specific
actions
2 000 000 29 363 000 7 %
Subtotal 51 363 000 900 000 750 000 1 750 000 3 400 000 54 763 000 6 %
EU-Equatorial Guinea
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1236/90 of 25.4.1990 27.6.1989 to 26.6.1992 6 000 000 500 000 665 000 1 165 000 7 165 000 16 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1892/95 of 29.6.1995 1.7.1994 to 30.6.1997 412 500 120 000 127 500 247 500 660 000 38 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 114/98 of 18.12.1997 1.7.1997 to 30.6.2000 600 000 50 000 140 000 170 000 Surveillance 360 000 960 000 38 %
Subtotal 7 012 500 670 000 932 500 170 000 1 772 500 8 785 000 20 %
EU-Madagascar
Council Regulation (EEC) No 983/93 of 6.4.1993 21.5.1992 to 20.5.1995 1 350 000 375 000 450 000 825 000 2 175 000 38 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 498/96 of 19.3.1996 21.5.1995 to 20.5.1998 1 350 000 375 000 450 000 825 000 2 175 000 38 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 2585/98 of 26.11.1998 21.5.1998 to 20.5.2001 912 000 168 000 300 000 900 000 1 368 000 2 280 000 60 %
Subtotal 3 612 000 918 000 1 200 000 900 000 3 018 000 6 630 000 46 %
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EU-Morocco
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3954/92 of 19.12.1992 1.5.1992 to 30.4.1996 270 000 000 7 000 000 7 000 000 34 400 000 Specific
actions
48 400 000 318 400 000 15 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 150/97 of 12.12.1996 1.12.1995 to
31.11.1999
355 000 000 16 000 000 8 000 000 121 000 000 Specific
actions
145 000 000 500 000 000 29 %
Subtotal 625 000 000 23 000 000 15 000 000 155 400 000 193 400 000 818 400 000 24 %
EU–Mauritius
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1616/89 of 5.6.1989 1.12.1990 to
30.11.1993
1 200 000 480 000 120 000 150 000 Research 750 000 1 950 000 38 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1797/94 of 18.7.1994 1.12.1993 to
30.11.1996
975 000 380 000 100 000 480 000 1 455 000 33 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1975/97 of 7.10.1997 1.12.1996 to
30.11.1999
1 218 750 418 000 110 000 528 000 1 746 750 30 %
Subtotal 3 393 750 1 278 000 330 000 150 000 1 758 000 5 151 750 34 %
EU-Mauritania
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1177/91 of 18.4.1991 1.8.1990 to 31.7.1993 27 750 000 900 000 360 000 1 260 000 29 010 000 4 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/94 of 2.6.1994 1.8.1993 to 31.7.1996 26 000 000 900 000 360 000 1 260 000 27 260 000 5 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/96 of 25.6.1996 15.11.1995 to
30.6.1996
7 259 000 350 000 150 000 500 000 7 759 000 6 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 408/97 of 24.2.1997 1.8.1996 to 31.7.2001 266 800 000 2 250 000 3 000 000 Research 5 250 000 272 050 000 2 %
Subtotal 327 809 000 2 150 000 3 120 000 3 000 000 8 270 000 336 079 000 2 %
EU-Mozambique
Council Regulation (EEC) No 593/93 of 8.3.1993 1.1.1992 to 30.9.1993 300 000 180 000 180 000 480 000 38 %
Subtotal 300 000 180 000 0 0 180 000 480 000 38 %
EU-Estonia
Council Regulation (EEC) No 519/93 of 2.3.1993 5.7.1993 to 4.7.2003
Council Decision of 5.11.1993 1993 197 340
Council Regulation (EC) No 3685/93 of 20.12.1993 1994 378 641
Council Regulation (EC) No 3368/94 of 20.12.1994 1995 649 400
Council Regulation (EC) No 3082/95 of 21.12.1995 1996 736 000 (Amounts
determinedby
annual con-
sultation)
replaced by
Council Regulation (EC) No 2396/96 of 2.12.1996 1.1.1997 to 31.12.2006
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Council Regulation (EC) No 398/97 of 20.12.1996 1997 765 530
Council Regulation (EC) No 53/98 of 19.12.1997 1998 465 467
Council Regulation (EC)No 57/1999 of 18.12.1998 1999 519 000
Council Regulation (EC) No 2517/2000 of 9.11.2000 2000 448 895
Subtotal 4 160 273 0 0 0 0 4 160 273 0 %
EU-Latvia
Council Regulation (EEC) No 520/93 of 2.3.1993 5.8.1993 to 4.8.2003
Council Regulation (EC) No 3687/93 of 20.12.1993 1994 166 817
Council Regulation (EC) No 3370/94 of 20.12.1994 1995 426 455
Council Regulation (EC) No 3084/95 of 21.12.1995 1996 496 100
replaced by (Amounts
determined
on annual
consultation)
Council Regulation (EC) No 2394/96 of 2.12.1996 9.12.1996 to 8.12.2002
Council Regulation (EC) No 400/97 of 20.12.1996 1997 534 300
Council Regulation (EC) No 55/98 of 19.12.1997 1998 430 300
Council Regulation (EC) No 59/1999 of 18.12.1998 1999 177 923
Council Regulation (EC) No 2742/1999 of 17.12.1999 2000 252 000
Subtotal 2 483 895 0 0 0 0 2 483 895 0 %
EU-Lithuania
Council Regulation (EEC) No 521/93 of 2.3.1993 13.4.1993 to 12.4.2003 00
Council Regulation (EC) No 3689/93 of 20.12.1993 1994 352 350
Council Regulation (EC) No 3372/94 of 20.12.1994 1995 498 500
Council Regulation (EC) No 3086/95 of 21.12.1995 1996 763 000
replaced by (Amounts
determined
on annual
consultation)
Council Regulation (EC) No 2395/96 of 2.12.1996 1.1.1997 to 31.12.2003
Council Regulation (EC) No 402/97 of 20.12.1996 1997 1 041 048
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Council Regulation (EC) No 57/98 of 19.12.1997 1998 563 510
Council Regulation (EC) No 2473/1999 of 22.11.1999 1999 669 700
Council Regulation (EC) No 2765/2000 of 14.12.2000 2000 614 200
Subtotal 4 502 308 0 0 0 0 4 502 308 0 %
EU-São Tomé e Princípe
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1295/91 of 14.5.1991 1.6.1990 to 31.5.1993 1 650 000 150 000 375 000 525 000 2 175 000 24 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 3221/93 of 22.11.1993 1.6.1993 to 31.5.1996 1 650 000 250 000 275 000 525 000 2 175 000 24 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1130/97 of 17.6.1997 1.6.1996 to 31.5.1999 1 800 000 187 500 35 000 152 500 International
organisations
375 000 2 175 000 17 %
Council Decision 2000/92/EC of 24.1.2000 1.6.1999 to 31.5.2002 956 250 286 875 191 250 478 125 956 250 1 912 500 50 %
Subtotal 6 056 250 874 375 876 250 630 625 2 381 250 8 437 500 28 %
EU-Senegal
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2296/93 of 22.7.1993 2.10.1992 to 1.10.1994 31 200 000 600 000 200 000 800 000 32 000 000 3 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 1982/95 of 29.6.1995 2.10.1994 to 1.10.1996 15 800 000 458 000 230 000 1 512 000 2 200 000 18 000 000 12 %
Council Decision 97/531/EC of 24.7.1997 2.10.1996 to 1.11.1996 750 000 0 750 000 0 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 542/98 of 9.5.1998 1.5.1997 to 30.4.2001 48 000 000 0 48 000 000 0 %
Subtotal 95 750 000 1 058 000 430 000 1 512 000 3 000 000 98 750 000 3 %
EU-Seychelles
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3193/90 of 29.10.1990 18.1.1990 to 17.1.1993 6 900 000 2 700 000 300 000 3 000 000 9 900 000 30 %
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2718/93 of 28.9.1993 18.1.1993 to 17.1.1996 6 900 000 2 700 000 300 000 3 000 000 9 900 000 30 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 2407/96 of 12.12.1996 18.1.1996 to 17.1.1999 6 900 000 2 700 000 300 000 3 000 000 9 900 000 30 %
Council Regulation (EC) No 341/1999 of 10.5.1999 18.1.1999 to 17.1.2002 6 900 000 1 950 000 300 000 1 200 000 3 450 000 10 350 000 33 %
Subtotal 27 600 000 10 050 000 1 200 000 1 200 000 12 450 000 40 050 000 31 %
EU-Tanzania
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3941/90 of 19.12.1990 22.12.1990 to
21.12.1993
1 050 000 430 000 200 000 630 000 1 680 000 38 %
Subtotal 1 050 000 430 000 200 000 0 630 000 1 680 000 38 %
Grand total 1 821 867 476 86 602 715 35 196 650 176 962 625 298 761 990 2 120 629 466 14 %
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COST OF THE AGREEMENTS AND THE QUANTITIES
CAUGHT/JOBS/VALUES OF CATCHES
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average
Morocco Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
102 102 2 127 121 91
Value of the catches(mio EUR) 221 223 98 470 288 260
Catches(tonnes ) 188 973 199 633 37 019 330 013 209 329 192 993
Jobs(number of employees ) 7 201 6 737 3 570 8 115 7 199 6 564
Mauritania Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
999 6 2 5 42 9
Value of the catches(mio EUR) 58 82 94 109 150 98
Catches(tonnes ) 31 049 32 368 31 059 51 880 133 038 55 879
Jobs(number of employees ) 1 475 1 457 1 461 1 703 2 466 1 712
Senegal Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
16 0 18 0 13 9
Value of the catches(mio EUR) 33 24 36 19 9 24
Catches(tonnes ) 16 145 12 389 18 297 6 038 4 352 11 444
Jobs(number of employees ) 542 526 878 395 233 515
Greenland Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
35 36 38 38 39 37
Value of the catches(mio EUR) 33 24 13 41 58 34
Catches(tonnes ) n/a n/a 30 423 43 976 49 244 24 729
Jobs(number of employees ) Average of 400 jobs 400
Cost/tonne (euro)
Morocco 539 509 41 385 578 469
Mauritania 279 268 283 1 204 409 512
Senegal 990 8 977 17 2 930 818
Greenland n/a n/a 1 239 872 789 1 508
Cost/job (euro)
Morocco 14 156 15 072 426 15 649 16 807 13 801
Mauritania 5 876 5 948 6 014 36 688 22 044 16 697
Senegal 29 502 190 20 364 253 54 721 18 190
Greenland 88 175 90 650 94 250 95 850 97 125 93 210
Value of catches/cost (euro)
Morocco 2,2 2,2 64,7 3,7 2,4 2,9
Mauritania 6,7 9,4 10,7 1,7 2,8 3,4
Senegal 2,1 242,0 2,0 185,7 0,7 2,6
Greenland 0,9 0,7 0,3 1,1 1,5 0,9
Source: Table drawn up by the Court of Auditorson the bas isof figuresin the Ifremer/COM evaluation.
Thistable s howsthe relations hip between the cos t of the agreements(borne by the Community budget) and the added value in termsof jobs ,
quantities and values of catches. There are substantial differences, not only from one agreement to another, but also within one and the same
agreement. For example, for the period 1993 to 1997, the cos t/job ratio of the Greenland Agreement wasfour timeshigher than that of the
Morocco Agreement (93 210 euro as against 13 801 euro). In the absence of any evaluation or detailed, ongoing monitoring, no explanation
for these differences can be given. These figures, which are only global and indicative in nature, have to be interpreted with caution, as their
reliability cannot be guaranteed and some of them do not take important parameters into account, for example, the cost/tonne ratio does not
distinguish between the species that are caught (lack of more precise data). Furthermore, the financial compensation paid under an agree-
ment is global in nature, i.e. it is not possible to identify the cost of a particular activity or that of fishing for a specific species. It is therefore
impossible to compare the cost to the Community budget of two different agreements relating to the same species.
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SUMMARY
Cost-benefit ratio
I. The Commission agrees that there are weaknesses in the sys-
tem for monitoring and evaluating the international fisheries
agreements that need to be addressed. An important step was
taken in 1999 when the results of an outside evaluation study
were forwarded to the Council for discussion. It would seem that
this study was also very useful to the Court when drawing up its
special report. Furthermore, the Commission has improved the
preparatory arrangementsfor the negotiation of new protocolsby
drawing up specific assessment reports containing, among other
things, data on the state of stocks, on catch levels, on the use of
fishing possibilities and on the amounts allocated to targeted
measures, research, control and technical aspects. These reports
are available to the European Parliament and the Council.
Despite the progress that has been achieved, further improvement
is needed. On the question of ongoing monitoring, the Commis-
sion would like to point out that data from the Member States for
determining the attainment of objectivesare very often lacking.
The Commission hopes that the adoption on 14 March 2001 of
the rulesfor the implementation of the ‘Control Regulation’ will
help ensure more regular and fuller information from Member
States, allowing in particular better monitoring of actual catches
under the variousagreements .
In addition, in accordance with the Financial Regulation rules, the
Commission intends to launch a new external evaluation study
within two to three years.
In the light of the conclusions of the debate on the Green Paper
on the future of the common fis heriespolicy, and aspart of the
administrative reform now under way, the Commission will
endeavour to establish criteria and performance indicators for the
agreements.
II. The Court refersto the Agreementswith Greenland and
Senegal.
Article 1(2) of the new Protocol to the Agreement with Greenland
sets out the catch possibilities available to Community vessels for
the period 2001 to 2006. These have been fixed on the basis of
scientific assessments and historical catches.
In the case of Senegal, the Commission has negotiated a new cat-
egory of fishing in the Protocol for 1997 to 2001, in the light of
the negotiating directivesit received from the Council.
The Commission, finding that Member States occasionally over-
estimate their needs in terms of fishing opportunities, emphasises
to them each time negotiationstake place that they s hould keep
their requests at a level at which they can be used up in full.
Intended purposes
III. TheCommissionisawareofthepotentialforconflictbetween
the structural and international aspects of the common fisheries
policy.
Together with the Member States, it will address this question in
the course of the debate on the future of the common fisheries
policy after 2002, in order to achieve greater consistency between
the different objectives.
IV. The fisheries agreements, which to start with were purely
commercial, have gradually introduced aimsfor the development
of the fishing industry in the countries concerned. This approach
reflects, among other things, concern to ensure consistency
between the Community policy and agreementsand development
policy.
Funding for measures to develop fisheries in the developing coun-
triescomesfromtheFinancialInstrumentsfordevelopmentcoop-
eration (EDF and budget headings).
Fisheries cooperation measures such as those contained in certain
bilateral fisheries agreements (targeted measures) receive funding
under the only budget heading to which fis heriesagreementsmay
be charged (heading B7-8000 )a n dfull detailsare given in the
termsof the agreements .
Since the adoption of the conclusions of the October 1997 meet-
ingofFisheriesMinistersthetargetedmeasureshavebeenextended
to encourage the introduction of meansfor ens uring the more
responsible exploitation of fishery resources, in particular in the
area of evaluation and in the surveillance and control of fishing
activities.
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non-membercountriesistomaintainfishingopportunities,which
thems elvescreate jobsin the areasdependent on fis hing. The con-
clusions of the October 1997 meeting of Fisheries Ministers pro-
vide that aspects which cannot be quantified such as the Union’s
political relations and the strategic importance of the presence of
theCommunityfleetinnon-membercountriesmustalsobetaken
into account.
Management and control
V. In order to strengthen the legally binding nature of fisheries
agreementsandimprovetheirmonitoring,theCommission,when
negotiating new protocols, seeks to include a requirement on the
compulsory exchange of scientific information. In addition, the
majority of fis heriesagreementsprovide that where cons ervation
or other measures affecting the fishing activities of the Commu-
nity fleet are adopted by the authoritiesof the non-member coun-
try, the termsof the protocolsand technical annexes , including
the financial provisions, may be adapted in consequence.
As well, in the case of targeted measures, for example, reporting
requirementshave been included in new protocolss ince the
October 1997 Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers.
Asregardslandingsand reloading under the Agreement with
Morocco, it should be noted that, although the terms of the agree-
ment on this matter were complied with, the Commission had
made known its intention of revising the clauses concerning land-
ingsduring the negotiation of the new protocol, which proved
unsuccessful.
With a view to sound financial management and the protection
of the Community’s financial interests, Directorate-General (DG)
Budget and the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), and any other
departmentsconcerned, will be involved from the s tart of the
preparationsfor negotiationsand as ked to attend meetingsbefore
and during the negotiation of new protocols.
VI. Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 sets out the general obligations
of both the Member States and the Commission regarding moni-
toring, inspection and surveillance of fishing activities in Com-
munitywatersandofCommunityfishingvesselsoperatingbeyond
those waters. Specific obligations concerning these matters are
contained in fis heriesagreementsand regulationslaying down
regional fisheries organisations’ schemes.
Before the start of the fishing year, the Commission establishes
the inspection priorities. Inspection programmes are drawn up
for its inspectors as and when fishing proceeds. Each inspection
assignment is carefully prepared. However, once on board Com-
mission inspectors may only observe the control operations car-
ried out by the Member Statesand verify that they are being car-
ried out in accordance with the agreed rules.
The Commission has taken a number of steps in recent years to
improvethecontroloffisheries.Majorprogresshasbeenachieved.
The Commission is well aware of the continuing weaknesses and
will take further action to address them.
Concerning the follow-up to previous findings, the Commission
examinesall alleged breachescontained in the ins pection reports .
A decision is then taken whether to exchange information with
the Member Statesor initiate legal proceedings .
Aspart of the 2002 review of the common fis heriespolicy, the
Commission will examine with Member States ways of improv-
ing inspection by the Commission and control by the Member
States.
GENERAL CONTEXT
Objective and scope of the audit
7 and 8. The general findingsin the Court’sreport are bas ed on
a study of five agreements out of the 23 in force when the audit
wascarried out. It isvery difficult, therefore, to draw general con-
clusions. Three of the five agreements examined by the Court
have very specific characteristics, and account for a very substan-
tial proportion of the Community budget allocated to the agree-
ments. They are of major political interest however.
It should be noted also that two of them no longer exist and
another has been substantially recast (the Agreement with Argen-
tina having expired, that with Greenland having been totally
revised and that with Morocco not having been renewed). The
Protocolsto the Agreementswith Mauritania and Senegal are
being renegotiated.
10. On account of the Court’s repeated observations, the Com-
mission has included in its proposal for the revision of the Finan-
cial Regulation specific provisions to take account of this situa-
tion.Furthermore,intheinterestsoftransparency,theCommission
includeseach year under contingent liabilitiesall amountsthat
have not yet been committed corresponding to legal obligations
under agreementsin force. On 31 December 1999 thes e amounts
stood at EUR 129 million.
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An instrument for monitoring the agreements
14 to 16. Following the conclusions of the October 1997 Coun-
cil meeting of Fisheries Ministers, the Commission undertook an
evaluation with the assistance of an outside consultant, the results
of which were presented to and discussed with the Council in
1999.
A new evaluation isplanned in two to three years . Until then,
internal work will be improved following the reinforcement of the
evaluation function.
The evaluation of international fis heriesagreementswill be one
factor among others during the debate on the Commission Green
Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy.
17. Theuseofbudgetaryappropriationsdidindeedincreasefrom
1993 to 1999, as a result mainly of significant increases in the
financial compensation associated with the Agreements with
Morocco, Mauritania, Greenland and Argentina. None of these
Agreements can easily be compared with its predecessors. The
Council decideswhether the cos t negotiated isa reas onable one
for the opportunitiesreceived.
18. The technical data sheets (evaluation reports) referred to by
the Court were introduced following the October 1997 Council
meeting of Fisheries Ministers. The sheets, which have been
improvedsincethen,aresenttoParliamentandtheCouncilbefore
negotiations start on new protocols.
In addition to examining historical, legal, political, economic and
other aspects, the Commission considers in the evaluation report
consistency with other areas of the common fisheries policy and
other Community policies, in particular development policy. This
assessment report contains data on the state of stocks, on catch
levels, on the rate of use of fishing possibilities, and on the use of
the funds allocated to targeted measures, research, the monitor-
ing of fishing activities and technical aspects.
However, despite the progress that has been achieved, the con-
tentsof the evaluation reportsneed further improvement.
Underutilisation of the agreements
19. An evaluation such as the one referred to by the Court is
alwaysat the bas isof any agreement concluded but other politi-
cal and economic criteria may also have an impact on the final
result.
20. The Commission, finding that Member States occasionally
overestimate their needs in terms of fishing possibilities, asks
them, each time negotiationstake place, to fix their requirements
at a level at which they can be used in full.
21. In the case of Senegal, the Commission asked for a new cat-
egory of fishing because of firm requests from within the Council.
22. The fishing possibilities in the Protocol to the Greenland
Agreement initialled on 13 September 2000 are set at a much
lower level than previously, following a detailed review.
The catch possibilities available to Community vessels in the
period 2001 to 2006 have been fixed on the basis of scientific
assessments and historical catches.
One of the advantagesof the Greenland Agreement isthat it
allowsthe Community to exchange quotaswith Norway, Iceland
and the Faeroe Islands, and to purchase additional quotas.
It should be noted also that the Greenland Agreement is and has
been the only Community funding instrument which provides
assistance for Greenland. This means that, implicitly at least, its
scope is wider than that of other fisheries agreements. This was
recognised on the conclusion of the negotiation of the fourth Pro-
tocol by the following unilateral Community statement: ‘... that
on the basis of its own assessments, an amount of EUR 28 mil-
lion out of the financial compensation ... was deemed to reflect
the genuine fis heriescomponentsasthey s tand at pres ent’.
23. The Commission agrees that guarantees could reduce under-
utilisation of agreements. There is no consensus in the Council,
however, on their application.
A system like this would require financial guarantees from ship-
owners when applying for fishing possibilities during the negotia-
tion of new agreementsor protocols . The payment of advancesby
tuna vessels is a specific case of a guarantee.
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25. The Commission is systematically trying to ensure that ship-
ownersbear a larger s hare but the final outcome will depend on
the negotiations with the Member States, some of which are
strongly opposed to any increase. The Commission, nevertheless,
iscontinuing to s eek one.
Since the October 1997 meeting of Council Ministers, the Com-
mission has secured an increase in the relative share of the costs
for some tuna agreements (Gabon, Seychelles, Angola, São Tomé,
Guinea, Mauritius, Côte d’Ivoire) in the sense that shipowners
now pay relatively more (European Union/shipowners’ shares
having changed from 80/20 to 75/25).
Indispensable information
26 and 27. The Commission is progressively introducing assess-
ment criteria in accordance with the Council conclusions of
October1997.Sincethen,beforenegotiationsstartontherenewal
of existing protocols, the Commission sends an evaluation report
to the Council and, from late 2000, to Parliament aswell.
The contentsof the evaluation report are des cribed in point 18.
THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENTS
Stability of fishing opportunities
29. The level of catches taken by Community vessels operating
under fis heriesagreementsin non-member countriesdeclined
sharply in 2000 as a result of the failure to renew the Agreement
with Morocco; the share of the Community budget earmarked for
fis heriesagreementswascut by half in that year.
Supply to the market and aid to employment
30. The principal objective of the fis heriesagreementscon-
cluded with non-member countries is to maintain fishing possi-
bilities, which themselves create jobs in the Community regions
dependent on fishing. It is true, as the Court says, that the most
complete information about jobslinked to the fis heriesagree-
mentsiscontained in the evaluation s tudy pres ented to the Coun-
cil in 1999.
31. The performance criteria will have to focus on essential
as pectsof the agreementss uch asthe attainment of the objectives
regarding fishing possibilities, which is the most important one
for the Community when examining the rate of utilisation of indi-
vidual agreements. The attainment of the objectives regarding tar-
geted measures will also have to be assessed in so far as it is ben-
eficial not only to the fishing interests of the coastal country but
also to the sustainable nature of the management of the resources
in question to which Community fishermen have access. Aspects
concerning restructuring and employment will have to be incor-
porated in a more broad-based way in the light of the mobility of
the fleets.
Restructuring strategy
32. The Commission shares the view of the Court. The Green
Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy states that
there is a problem of consistency within the common fisheries
policy between, for example, fis heriesagreementson one hand
and vessel transfers receiving support under the Financial Instru-
ment for Fisheries Guidance on the other. Vessels owned by com-
panieswith predominantly European financial interes tsare com-
peting for the same resource but under different rules.
The Commission will seek to ensure greater consistency between
the variouscomponentsof the common fis heriespolicy in the
framework of the 2002 review.
The Commission would like to underline the considerable tight-
ening of the rules on the grant of assistance to the fleet under the
new Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (Regulation (EC)
No 2792/1999) for the period 2000 to 2006, in particular for
joint enterprises. Unfortunately, the Council was unwilling to
adopt the Commission proposal to prevent the issue of licences
to vessels belonging to fleet segments which failed to comply with
the objectivesof the multiannual guidance programmes .
33 and 34. The Commission agrees with the Court of Auditors’
analysis that a resegmentation of the Spanish and Portuguese
fleetsoperating in Moroccan waterswould have been des irable as
a way of better regulating a programmed decrease in fishing effort
asprovided for in the fis heriesagreement. For reas onslinked to
the regulatory provisions (the presence of a single international
fleet segment in the multiannual guidance programme (MAGP)
andthetimetable(non-overlapofperiodsofapplicationofMAGPs
and the Agreement), the Spanish authorities, when asked to
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it could not then be adopted by the Commission. Politically, as it
was not possible to redeploy the overcapacity identifiable at the
time because of lack of alternative fishing possibilities, the pro-
grammed scrapping of 40 % of the vessels in question was an
indefensible option in circumstances where at that particular time
the collapse of the agreement had not been established with suf-
ficient certainty.
The Commission recognises the special nature of investments in
shipbuilding in a fishery under threat: it is true that 125 vessels
began fishing under the Agreement with Morocco during the
period of the last Protocol (1 December 1995 to 30 November
1999), including 54 newly-built onesthat had received public
funding. It should be noted, however, that the selection of invest-
ment projects , which wasa matter for the Member Statescon-
cerned, wasmade in compliance with the criteria laid down in
Community rules. As in the case of the implementation of the
MAGPs,itmustbeemphasisedthattheCommissionhasnopower
to oppose aids for shipbuilding once the objectives set for the cor-
responding fleet segment are not overrun. Consequently it was
not possible to create a fleet segment for this particular case. This
matter will have to be dealt with in the future.
The reduction in the number of licencesduring the term of the
last Protocol to the Agreement with Morocco represents part of
the overall restructuring of the international segment.
Thecommonfisheriespolicyseekstoimprovethebalancebetween
fishing effort, and hence fleet capacity, and the resources avail-
able, including under fis heriesagreementsand in international
waters. The existing available instruments (MAGPs) and the object
to which they apply (vessels with a life of some 30 years) are dif-
ficult to reconcile however with political decisions that can rap-
idly reduce fishing possibilities to levels that create situations
which are difficult to manage.
35. The main aim of the Agreement with Argentina was to assist
in efforts to restructure the fleet and in particular to seek the
transfer of vessels which had lost fishing opportunities in other
fishing areas.
The Commission considers that the goal of restructuring the
Community fleet hasbeen attained through the definitive trans fer
to Argentina of 29 vessels as part of joint enterprises and the tem-
porary transfer of three vessels as part of joint ventures.
By itsnature the Agreement with Argentina impliesthat, aspart
of joint enterprises, the vessels are transferred definitively and
consequently fly the Argentinian flag and are fully subject to
Argentinian law.
Regarding other as pectsof thisAgreement on which the Com-
mission considered that Argentina had failed to comply, it should
be noted that the Commission has suspended payment of the bal-
ance of EUR 6 million of the aid for scientific and technical coop-
eration.
36. (See reply to point 32.)
Coordination of Community policies
37. To ensure consistency between development policy and the
common fis heriespolicy, in particular through itsbilateral agree-
ments, the Commission has made a number of adjustments to the
two policies in question and to their implementing procedures.
Considerable progress has been achieved since the October 1997
Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers: evaluation reports on
agreementsand protocolsare now prepared by DG Fis heries
(FISH) in close cooperation with DG Development (DEV); the lat-
ter takespart in negotiations ; an interdepartmental group has
been set up between DG FISH and DG DEV; DG FISH attends
annual meetingson individual countriesarranged by DG DEV
(countryreviews);targetedmeasureshavebeenextendedtoencour-
age the more responsible exploitation of resources. In addition,
since the October 1997 meeting, reporting requirements for these
measures have been introduced during the negotiation of new
protocols.
The Commission adopted a communication on fisheries and pov-
erty reduction in November 2000 and examined the international
dimension in the Green Paper on the future of the common fish-
eries policy, presented in March 2001. In both cases, coordina-
tion is the focus of the Commission’s analysis and proposals.
39. On the question of the increase in EDF funding, the alloca-
tion for Senegal rose from EUR 22,7 million in the period 1994
to 1996 to EUR 27,9 million in the period 1997 to 1998. This
increase had been decided on independently of the negotiations
onthefisheriesagreement,allofthefundshavingbeenearmarked
for development measures (road maintenance, education, health,
etc.) totally unconnected with fisheries. The development mea-
sures for fisheries contained in certain bilateral fisheries agree-
ments (targeted measures) are funded under the only budget head-
ing to which fis heriesagreementscan be charged and full details
of the amountsare given in the termsof the agreement.
Development meas uresfor fis heriesin developing countriesare
funded under the Financial Instruments for development coop-
eration (EDF).
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concerned, considerable progress has been achieved in recent
years, as explained in point 37.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS
Management shortcomings
42. On the question of the unilateral two-month suspension by
Morocco of fishing for cephalopods on biological grounds, the
Joint Committee waseffectively blocked over thisis s ue due to a
difference of interpretation of the justification. The Moroccan side
refused to provide scientific data.
The Commission, when negotiating new protocols, seeks to
include a requirement on the compulsory exchange of scientific
information. In addition, the majority of fisheries agreements
provide that where conservation or other measures affecting the
fishing activities of the Community fleet are taken by the authori-
tiesof the non-member country, the termsof the protocolsand
technical annexes, including the financial provisions, may be
adapted in consequence. The Agreement with Morocco for the
period 1995 to 1999 did not contain such a clause.
In the case of Argentina, while the Agreement made no direct
provision for the possibility of reducing the Community contri-
bution to scientific and technical cooperation (financial compen-
sation), the Commission, considering that the fishing possibili-
tieshad been reduced unilaterally and that s ome termsof the
Agreement had not been observed, suspended payment of the
balance of the aid for scientific and technical cooperation.
43. The Commission is aware of concerns about the monitor-
ing of specific measures. However, a uniform approach cannot be
applied and the special circumstances of each agreement have
also to be considered.
In any negotiation there isa ques tion of balance asregardsobjec-
tives. Non-member countries consider that the agreements rep-
resent an exchange of fishing possibilities in return for funding.
The Commission, however, would like to mention the recent
agreementswhich include reporting requirements .
In the case of Senegal, for example, the Protocol for 1997 to 2001
provided that a substantial part of the compensation would be
allocated to developing the national fishing industry. At the Com-
mission’srequest,theSenegaleseauthoritieshavepresentedreports
on the use made of the compensation.
44. The Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries
policy recognises that in order to allow for an assessment of value
formoney,fisheriesagreementsshoulddistinguishclearlybetween
fisheries and development.
46 and 47. In the case of the landings and reloading under the
Agreement with Morocco referred to by the Court, the Commis-
sion would point out that the vessels’ obligations regarding land-
ingswere res pected.
In addition, Annex III to the Agreement states clearly that landed
fis hery productsare regarded asgoodsin ‘temporary trans it’.
Shipowners decide on the use to which the goods on their vessels
are put. They may be processed, stored under customs control,
sold in Morocco or exported.
However, despite the fact that the Agreement was observed, the
Commission made known its intention of revising the clauses on
landingsduringthenegotiationsonthenewprotocol,whichwere
unsuccessful.
Control shortcomings
48 and 49. At the start of each year the Commission draws up a
general programme for fisheries inspections under which its
ins pectorsattend ins pectionscarried out by the Member Statesat
sea and in ports, and at fish marketing venues.
The inspection unit keeps a detailed list of the dates of assign-
mentsplanned and of portslikely to be vis ited and preparesa
report on itsactivitiesduring the previousyear.
However, the small number of Commission inspectors available
means that priorities have to be set for inspection assignments.
In the case of fisheries agreements, control objectives and specific
checksare comprehens ively provided for already in the Commu-
nity rules and the terms of the agreements. Responsibility for
checkingtheagreedarrangementsisamatterforthe non-member
countriesand the Member Statesconcerned under the Commu-
nity rules in force. These rules, in particular Articles 17 and 18 of
Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, impose obligations on the Member
States, compliance with which has to be checked by the Commis-
sion.
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studied by the competent departments in DG FISH which, acting
in accordance with the Community ruleson the monitoring of
fishingactivities,makeanevaluationofeachshortcomingdetected
during inspections carried out in the Member States. A decision
isthen taken whether to exchange information with the Member
Statesor to initiate legal proceedings .
However, as it may be possible to tighten up the system, this mat-
ter will be raised with the Member States during the debate on the
Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy.
51. The Commission is aware of the shortcomings referred to by
the Court and regularly drawsMember States ’ attention to the
need to record catchesand landings .
In addition, it encouragescooperation between ins pection depart-
mentswithin and between Member States .
The implementation of the special provisions on control in the
fis heriesagreementshass ubs tantially improved compliance with
the existing obligations.
53. It istrue that s ome irregularitiesinvolving entriesin log-
books were committed by certain vessels operating under fisher-
iesagreements .
The Commission considers that these breaches are not systematic.
Furthermore, the logbook isonly one of s everal factorsus ed to
measure the benefits of fisheries agreements.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Cost-benefit ratio
54. The Commission agrees that there are weaknesses in the sys-
tem for monitoring and evaluating international fisheries agree-
ments that need to be addressed. However, the situation has much
improved recently. An important step was taken in 1999 when
the results of an external evaluation study were forwarded to the
Council for discussion. Furthermore, the Commission has gradu-
ally been introducing assessment criteria in accordance with the
Council conclusions of October 1997. Since then, before negotia-
tionson the renewal of exis ting protocolstake place, the Com-
mission sends an assessment report to the Council and, from late
2000, to Parliament as well. These assessment reports contain
data on the state of stocks, on catch levels, on the rate of use of
fishing possibilities, on the use of amounts allocated to targeted
measures and other relevant matters.
Internal work hasalready been carried out and more evaluation
isplanned with the development of the evaluation function. In
addition, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, the Com-
mission intends to launch a new external evaluation study in two
to three years.
In order to improve knowledge of the state of stocks, the Com-
mission has stepped up cooperation with the FAO in this field.
It should be pointed out too that the regular meetings of the Joint
Committees are an essential tool in the ongoing monitoring of
the functioning of the agreements.
It isimportant to remember in thisres pect that there are two s ov-
ereign parties, the Community and the non-member country, and
that the proper functioning of an agreement dependson coopera-
tion on both sides. In the light of the conclusions of the debate
on the Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy,
and also as part of the administrative reform now under way, the
Commission will seek to establish criteria and performance indi-
catorsfor the agreements .
55. The Commission is systematically seeking to ensure that
shipowners bear a larger share of the cost of international agree-
ments. However, the final outcome will depend on the negotia-
tionswith the Member States . Since the October 1997 Council
meeting of Fisheries Ministers, the Commission has secured an
increase in the relative share of the costs for a significant number
oftunaagreements(Gabon,Seychelles,Angola,SãoTomé,Guinea,
Mauritius, Côte d’Ivoire) in the sense that shipowners now pay
relatively more (European Union/shipowners’ shares having
changed from 80/20 to 75/25).
The Commission is continuing to seek an increase even if some
Member States are strongly opposed.
The Commission agrees with the Court that requests from Mem-
ber States during negotiations should actually be used by vessel
owners. Guarantees could be a means of achieving this. Under the
newFinancialInstrumentforFisheriesGuidanceRegulation,guar-
antees have been introduced for the establishment of joint enter-
prises.
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callsfor an examination of the extens ion of the obligation, already
existing in a number of agreements with developing countries, of
a financial contribution from shipowners receiving fishing rights
under agreementsinvolving Community financial compens ation,
also in the case of fisheries agreements with the northern and Bal-
tic States.
The intended purpose of the agreements
56. The fisheries agreements, which to start with were purely
commercial, have gradually introduced development aimsfor the
fishingindustryinthecountriesconcerned.Thisapproachreflects,
amongotherthings,concerntoensureconsistencybetweenCom-
munity policy and agreementsand development policy.
Funding for measures to develop the fishing industry in the devel-
oping countriescomesfrom the Financial Ins trumentsfor devel-
opment cooperation (EDF and budget headings).
Fisheries cooperation measures such as those contained in certain
bilateral fisheries agreements (targeted measures) receive funding
under the only budget heading to which fis heriesagreementsmay
be charged (heading B7-8000 )a n dfull detailsare s et out in the
termsof the agreements .
It should be noted also that the amount earmarked for the tar-
geted meas uresformspart of the funding which the Community
hasdecided to allocate to the agreement. In addition, thismeans
that part of the Community contribution can be used for mea-
sures to encourage the more responsible exploitation of the non-
member country’s fishery resources.
To ensure consistency between development policy and the com-
mon fis heriespolicy, in particular through itsbilateral agree-
ments, the Commission has made a number of adjustments to the
two policies in question and to their implementing procedures.
Considerable progress has been achieved since the October 1997
Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers: evaluation reports on
agreementsand protocolsare now prepared by DG FISH in clos e
cooperation with DG DEV; the latter takespart in the negotia-
tions; an interdepartmental group has been set up between DG
FISH and DG DEV; DG FISH attendsannual meetingson indi-
vidual countriesarranged by DG DEV (country reviews ); targeted
measures have been extended to encourage the introduction of
means of ensuring the more responsible exploitation of resources,
particularly in the area of evaluation and the surveillance and
control of fishing activities.
The Commission adopted a communication on fisheries and pov-
erty reduction in November 2000 and examined the international
dimension in the Green Paper on the future of the common fish-
eries policy, presented in March 2001. In both cases, coordina-
tion is the focus of the Commission’s analysis and proposals.
57. The Commission is aware of the need to ensure consistency
between the structural and international aspects of the common
fisheries policy. In partnership with the Member States, the Com-
mission will endeavour to provide appropriate instruments for
strengthening consistency between those two aspects, in particu-
lar during the debate on the Green Paper on the future of the
common fisheries policy.
When negotiating with non-member countrieson the renewal of
protocols, the Commission takes account of the circumstances in
the country, and in particular of the emergence of a fishing sec-
tor or the establishment of a national fleet. It provides support,
through targeted measures, for funding to that end.
Management shortcomings
58. The principal objective of the fis heriesagreementscon-
cluded with non-member countriesisto maintain fis hing oppor-
tunities , which thems elvescreate jobsin the areasdependent on
fishing. The conclusions of the October 1997 meeting of Fisher-
iesMinis tersprovide that as pectswhich cannot be quantified s uch
asthe Union’spolitical relationsand the s trategic importance of
the presence of the Community fleet in non-member countries
must also be taken into account.
In order to reinforce the legally binding nature of fisheries agree-
ments and improve their monitoring, the Commission, when
negotiating new protocols, seeks to include a requirement on the
compulsory exchange of scientific data. In addition, the majority
of fis heriesagreementsprovide that where cons ervation or other
measures affecting the fishing activities of the Community fleet
are adopted by the authoritiesof the non-member country, the
termsof the protocolsand technical annexes , including the finan-
cial provisions, may be adapted in consequence.
In addition, in the case of targeted measures, for example, report-
ing requirementshave been included in new protocolss ince the
October 1997 Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers.
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59. Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 sets out the general obliga-
tionsof both the Member Statesconcerned and the Commis s ion
regardingmonitoring,inspectionandsurveillanceoffishingactivi-
ties in Community waters and of Community fishing vessels
beyond those waters. Specific obligations concerning these mat-
tersare contained in fis hery agreementsand regulationslaying
down regional fisheries organisations’ schemes.
In view of the limited powersconferred on it in thisres pect, the
CommissionregularlychecksthewayinwhichtheMemberStates
apply the agreed rules.
The Commission has taken a number of steps in recent years to
improve fis heriescontrol. Major progres shasbeen achieved. The
Commission is well aware of the continuing weaknesses and will
take further action to address them.
Concerning the follow-up to previous findings, the Commission
departmentsexamine all alleged breachescontained in the ins pec-
tion reports. A decision is then taken on whether to exchange
information with the Member Statesor to initiate legal proceed-
ings.
Aspart of the 2002 review of the common fis heriespolicy, the
CommissionwillexaminewiththeMemberStateswaysofimprov-
ing inspection by the Commission and control by the Member
States.
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